Archive for October, 2008

From the Wall Street Journal’s MarketBeat blog: Unhappy Hour

Excerpt:

Daily trading activity has featured two distinctive sections: the six-and-a-half-hour slog that opens the day, and the “lightning round” frenzy that is the last hour. The final 60 minutes of trade in the stock market keeps stealing the show. …

In total, the Dow fell 28% from April 1 through the close on Oct. 17. But the Dow fell 13% when only taking into account the last hour of trade - nearly half its total decline. (It fell 5.3% if just the first hour is considered, which makes the 10:30 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. stretch equivalent to naptime.)

Not to nitpick, but on that first sentence: the whole 9:30 a.m.-4:00 p.m. trading day is 6 1/2 hours. Last thing you want is someone as math-challenged as me correcting your arithmetic!

My question is, how does the late-day volatility of the last seven months compare with the comparable period a year ago, or years past? There ’s no comparator cited here to help us judge. Maybe it’s in the research but didn’t make it into the blog post?


Here is welcome news for the trading community: Exchanges to Tackle Erroneous Trades Issue (TraderMagazine.com) Excerpt:

The major exchanges, in the wake of trading snafus in recent weeks, vowed to work together to craft and synchronize policies targeting error trades. …

Behind the decisions are complaints by broker-dealers and the STA over a lack of uniformity in exchange policies covering error trades and a need for exchanges to act as one National Market System on the issue. …

Brokers’ complaints follow a particularly bad day on Sept. 19, when tens of thousands of trades were pulled from the tape because they were considered erroneous.

“We will collectively work together to make it better,” Joe Mecane, an NYSE Euronext executive vice president and chief administrative officer of U.S. Markets, told the crowd. “And we have been working collectively at the exchange level to try to sync up our erroneous policies so at least there’s a common application.”

Why is this important? You can probably say it better than me, but my understanding is that if trades are to be broken, traders of course need to know that ASAP, so they can assess and address any risk exposur they and their customers face because of the busted trades. It therefore makes sense to have a harmonized approach that helps these decisions be made quickly and consistently across markets.


Here is welcome news for the trading community: Exchanges to Tackle Erroneous Trades Issue (TraderMagazine.com) Excerpt:

The major exchanges, in the wake of trading snafus in recent weeks, vowed to work together to craft and synchronize policies targeting error trades. …

Behind the decisions are complaints by broker-dealers and the STA over a lack of uniformity in exchange policies covering error trades and a need for exchanges to act as one National Market System on the issue. …

Brokers’ complaints follow a particularly bad day on Sept. 19, when tens of thousands of trades were pulled from the tape because they were considered erroneous.

“We will collectively work together to make it better,” Joe Mecane, an NYSE Euronext executive vice president and chief administrative officer of U.S. Markets, told the crowd. “And we have been working collectively at the exchange level to try to sync up our erroneous policies so at least there’s a common application.”

Why is this important? You can probably say it better than me, but my understanding is that if trades are to be broken, traders of course need to know that ASAP, so they can assess and address any risk exposur they and their customers face because of the busted trades. It therefore makes sense to have a harmonized approach that helps these decisions be made quickly and consistently across markets.


Calling all options people, calling all options people–yes that means you! Have I got some great news for you…have you heard that you can trade for FREE on NYSE Arca Options in any penny pilot issue if you enter an order prior to the open that is marketable for the auction, even if it doesn’t trade during the auction!? It’s true! Here’s how it works…

On 13 October, NYSE Arca Options expanded our free auction trading in penny pilot issues to include any orders received prior to auction and were marketable for auction but traded as part of an auction imbalance during sweep.

Now you can be assured that if you send an order to us prior to the auction that is priced at or better than the opening auction price, your order will trade for free, NO take fees! Wow! It’s like having your own personal virtual broker watching out for you!

For example, if an auction occurs at $1.20, and you have entered an order to pay $1.20 or greater, or a sell order priced at $1.20 or less, and these orders do not participate in the auction but trade as part of an auction imbalance during sweep, you will trade for free.

Just remember, if you cancel/replace your order once the auction has occurred, you won’t get the free trade. You can rest easy though, because NYSE Arca also has an awesome collar price protection mechanism during sweep that protects even market order imbalances from trading at wide prices while keeping your order in price time priority as the market moves.

If you haven’t checked out the auction yet, now is the time to do it! If you already love the auction/sweep process for its speed and price protection, it just got even better! On NYSE Arca Options, the early bird gets to trade FREE.


In my last post (which was an eternity ago back in July (just ask my 401(k) — it is kind of a 201(k) now), I highlighted the curious phenomenon that most of the dark pools, which employ anonymity and opacity in order to attract larger order size, have average trade sizes well below 600 shares. And who needs to cloak a whopping 300-share order anyway? But the small-trade-size phenomenon is more than just an intellectual curiosity. It is a symptom of a much bigger problem. We have lulled ourselves and the investors into thinking that anonymity and order opacity will fully answer for the negative performance attributed to transaction costs. And while “darkness” is a critical component of the transaction-cost puzzle, it does not in and of itself complete the whole transaction-cost “picture.”

Wayne Wagner, a pioneer and a leading figure in transactions cost analysis over the past 2+ decades, places transaction costs into two categories: visible and hidden costs. Visible costs like commission, spread costs and market impact are relatively easy to identify and quantify. Competitive pressures, technology and regulation have greatly decreased both commissions and spreads but anonymity and order opacity have been driving factors behind minimizing (though not eliminating) market impact.

Market impact is an elusive quarry, though. For while an order in a continuous dark pool or dark algo may be completely anonymous and totally non-displayed (pre-trade), it can still incur substantial market impact post trade. Jamie Selway gave a good example in our last blog chat when he said, “What about the fact that as you traded at the midpoint 123 times over the course of an hour, the midpoint moved against you 2%? No ‘tactical’ market impact, sure; but obviously tremendous impact overall.” The multiple-small-trade “footprint” of a continuous dark pool or dark algo can give away post trade all the transaction’s cost benefits (and more!) that pre-trade anonymity and opacity can bring to an order.

But, hang on; we have not even gotten to hidden costs yet! The hidden costs that Wayne identifies are delay and missed trades. In a recent presentation, Wayne described them in this way: “Hidden costs are 2-3 times the visible costs. Hidden costs arise from the need to trade in sizes that swamp the market. Waiting — or searching — for liquidity creates these costs. They are often as poisonous to performance as any other cost.”

The obvious consequences of delay and missed trades are information leakage, slippage, opportunity cost and even gaming. Each one festers the longer it takes to complete an order whether it is sliced into small orders over time or shopped to multiple dark venues.

But there is also a much-overlooked consequence and that is the lost benefit of the original investment decision (first-mover advantage, if you will). We focus so much on avoiding the costs of a transaction through slicing and dicing that we fail to capture the timely VALUE of an investment decision. Executing a block transaction quickly is still a valuable and perhaps preferable execution strategy to slicing a block into tiny orders.

For a dark pool to be truly effective across the transaction-cost spectrum (and thus capable of trading large blocks), it needs to be more than just “dark.” And clearly one of the more problematic aspects of today’s dark-pool and dark-algo offerings is their continuous, real-time nature. (Interestingly, all of the dark pools with small trade sizes are also continuous.) Each trade becomes a footprint and each subsequent footprint becomes a billboard betraying the investor’s trading intentions.

For those who know me, yes, it appears that I am simply trumping up the fact that a totally dark point-in-time cross like MatchPoint is the solution to the continuous issue (and it IS an elegant and effective solution at that!) but there are dark pools (continuous and not) that do go beyond “darkness” and are constructed in a way that smartly and effectively minimizes post-trade market impact and the hidden costs mentioned above while still catering to anonymity and order opacity.

Clearly point-in-time dark pools (like MatchPoint, Instinet VWAP cross and POSIT matches) break the cycle of continuous trade “footprints,” and “pinging” them is impossible. They also aggregate all trades from multiple parties into one trade report “footprint,” limiting even further any unnecessary information leakage. Other dark pools use minimum order-size requirements or functionality (like Pipeline) to inhibit algo “pinging” and attract true block liquidity, significantly reducing delay.

And block negotiation systems (like Liquidnet and BIDS) provide a pre-qualified vetting of contraside interest to reduce information leakage and promote natural block discovery as well as a “scorecard” concept to punish gaming. All of these are innovative, effective solutions to post- trade market impact, information leakage, slippage and gaming that can occur in a continuous dark pool environment, and there is more to be done for sure.

Block trades as much as algo order slicing are integral parts of the investment and transaction cycle. Understanding the transaction-cost “balance” between the two will help us evolve our marketplace to better accommodate and serve the diverse and sophisticated needs of all investors.


In my last post (which was an eternity ago back in July (just ask my 401(k) — it is kind of a 201(k) now), I highlighted the curious phenomenon that most of the dark pools, which employ anonymity and opacity in order to attract larger order size, have average trade sizes well below 600 shares. And who needs to cloak a whopping 300-share order anyway? But the small-trade-size phenomenon is more than just an intellectual curiosity. It is a symptom of a much bigger problem. We have lulled ourselves and the investors into thinking that anonymity and order opacity will fully answer for the negative performance attributed to transaction costs. And while “darkness” is a critical component of the transaction-cost puzzle, it does not in and of itself complete the whole transaction-cost “picture.”

Wayne Wagner, a pioneer and a leading figure in transactions cost analysis over the past 2+ decades, places transaction costs into two categories: visible and hidden costs. Visible costs like commission, spread costs and market impact are relatively easy to identify and quantify. Competitive pressures, technology and regulation have greatly decreased both commissions and spreads but anonymity and order opacity have been driving factors behind minimizing (though not eliminating) market impact.

Market impact is an elusive quarry, though. For while an order in a continuous dark pool or dark algo may be completely anonymous and totally non-displayed (pre-trade), it can still incur substantial market impact post trade. Jamie Selway gave a good example in our last blog chat when he said, “What about the fact that as you traded at the midpoint 123 times over the course of an hour, the midpoint moved against you 2%? No ‘tactical’ market impact, sure; but obviously tremendous impact overall.” The multiple-small-trade “footprint” of a continuous dark pool or dark algo can give away post trade all the transaction’s cost benefits (and more!) that pre-trade anonymity and opacity can bring to an order.

But, hang on; we have not even gotten to hidden costs yet! The hidden costs that Wayne identifies are delay and missed trades. In a recent presentation, Wayne described them in this way: “Hidden costs are 2-3 times the visible costs. Hidden costs arise from the need to trade in sizes that swamp the market. Waiting — or searching — for liquidity creates these costs. They are often as poisonous to performance as any other cost.”

The obvious consequences of delay and missed trades are information leakage, slippage, opportunity cost and even gaming. Each one festers the longer it takes to complete an order whether it is sliced into small orders over time or shopped to multiple dark venues.

But there is also a much-overlooked consequence and that is the lost benefit of the original investment decision (first-mover advantage, if you will). We focus so much on avoiding the costs of a transaction through slicing and dicing that we fail to capture the timely VALUE of an investment decision. Executing a block transaction quickly is still a valuable and perhaps preferable execution strategy to slicing a block into tiny orders.

For a dark pool to be truly effective across the transaction-cost spectrum (and thus capable of trading large blocks), it needs to be more than just “dark.” And clearly one of the more problematic aspects of today’s dark-pool and dark-algo offerings is their continuous, real-time nature. (Interestingly, all of the dark pools with small trade sizes are also continuous.) Each trade becomes a footprint and each subsequent footprint becomes a billboard betraying the investor’s trading intentions.

For those who know me, yes, it appears that I am simply trumping up the fact that a totally dark point-in-time cross like MatchPoint is the solution to the continuous issue (and it IS an elegant and effective solution at that!) but there are dark pools (continuous and not) that do go beyond “darkness” and are constructed in a way that smartly and effectively minimizes post-trade market impact and the hidden costs mentioned above while still catering to anonymity and order opacity.

Clearly point-in-time dark pools (like MatchPoint, Instinet VWAP cross and POSIT matches) break the cycle of continuous trade “footprints,” and “pinging” them is impossible. They also aggregate all trades from multiple parties into one trade report “footprint,” limiting even further any unnecessary information leakage. Other dark pools use minimum order-size requirements or functionality (like Pipeline) to inhibit algo “pinging” and attract true block liquidity, significantly reducing delay.

And block negotiation systems (like Liquidnet and BIDS) provide a pre-qualified vetting of contraside interest to reduce information leakage and promote natural block discovery as well as a “scorecard” concept to punish gaming. All of these are innovative, effective solutions to post- trade market impact, information leakage, slippage and gaming that can occur in a continuous dark pool environment, and there is more to be done for sure.

Block trades as much as algo order slicing are integral parts of the investment and transaction cycle. Understanding the transaction-cost “balance” between the two will help us evolve our marketplace to better accommodate and serve the diverse and sophisticated needs of all investors.


For those of you who accuse me of being a Nasdaq hater, that’s Reuters’s headline, not mine. If you’d prefer, you can take the DealBreaker blog’s headline on the same subject: Rules Were Meant To Be Broken.

Excerpts from the Reuters article:

The Nasdaq Stock Market’s decision to suspend one of its own listing rules comes as an avalanche of shares tumble below the $1 threshold, and is intended to avoid the mass delistings that followed the burst of the dot-com bubble. …

At the end of September, 227 securities were penny stocks, up from 64 at the same time last year, the exchange said. By Oct. 9, the number had jumped to 344. …

Glenn Tyranski, senior vice president of financial compliance at NYSE Regulation, the arm’s length regulatory arm at exchange parent NYSE Euronext said about 20 listings are below the minimum price requirement.

But NYSE is not now considering suspending its price requirement, he told Reuters. “It’s more than we’ve had previously, but we don’t have that wave of people that are tripping the (requirement) yet.”

While NYSE has never suspended its price requirements, Nasdaq did so shortly after the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, in an effort to keep plunging stocks on the public market. …

Although the current crisis is centered on the financial sector, the exchange wants to avoid a similar exodus of listings, from which it derives about 16 percent of overall revenue.

Let’s see…tough choice, revenue or rules, revenue or rules, eeny-meeny…aw heck, revenue rules!

DealBreaker concluded its item this way:

See, if your stock price slips under $1.00, NASDAQ generally de-lists you. But, well, rules were meant to be broken. And it’s just easier for Bob [Greifeld] this way, see?


For those of you who accuse me of being a Nasdaq hater, that’s Reuters’s headline, not mine. If you’d prefer, you can take the DealBreaker blog’s headline on the same subject: Rules Were Meant To Be Broken.

Excerpts from the Reuters article:

The Nasdaq Stock Market’s decision to suspend one of its own listing rules comes as an avalanche of shares tumble below the $1 threshold, and is intended to avoid the mass delistings that followed the burst of the dot-com bubble. …

At the end of September, 227 securities were penny stocks, up from 64 at the same time last year, the exchange said. By Oct. 9, the number had jumped to 344. …

Glenn Tyranski, senior vice president of financial compliance at NYSE Regulation, the arm’s length regulatory arm at exchange parent NYSE Euronext said about 20 listings are below the minimum price requirement.

But NYSE is not now considering suspending its price requirement, he told Reuters. “It’s more than we’ve had previously, but we don’t have that wave of people that are tripping the (requirement) yet.”

While NYSE has never suspended its price requirements, Nasdaq did so shortly after the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, in an effort to keep plunging stocks on the public market. …

Although the current crisis is centered on the financial sector, the exchange wants to avoid a similar exodus of listings, from which it derives about 16 percent of overall revenue.

Let’s see…tough choice, revenue or rules, revenue or rules, eeny-meeny…aw heck, revenue rules!

DealBreaker concluded its item this way:

See, if your stock price slips under $1.00, NASDAQ generally de-lists you. But, well, rules were meant to be broken. And it’s just easier for Bob [Greifeld] this way, see?


Latensanity

October 21st, 2008

“Latensanity” is a made-up word inspired by a headline in the September issue of Waters magazine on a column by Rob Daly, “Stop the Latency Insanity” (sorry, no link available). Excerpt:

The one universal law for trade execution seems to be that it can’t be fast enough, cheap enough or easy enough. But please, people, get a grip — there is only so much that physics can do with most firms’ existing architecture. …

Vendors and trading venues have begun liberally peppering their marketing materials with the prefix “micro” — and in a few cases, “nano” — but most firms won’t be able to take advantage of sub-millisecond capabilities without a major investment in their infrastructure.

On the “insanity” angle, Rob reports that some direct-market-access clients have asked the CFTC for permission to remove their pre-trade risk filters in order to shave off a few more milliseconds. In today’s volatile and highly automated markets, that strikes me as less than prudent.

I’m not a techie and though I know that NYSE Euronext is working on making our own trading platforms ever faster, I don’t follow this issue that closely. But that was the first time I remember anyone raising the question of whether the industry’s need for speed is approaching a point of diminishing returns. Rob concludes:

While reducing latency is an ever-present concern for firms, it must be addressed in a rational manner, balancing the potential return with its potential costs. Firms will likely see a greater return investing in better risk management or smart order routing technologies rather than spending resources on the expensive game of low-latency one-upmanship.

No sooner had I read the Waters column than I see in today’s Financial Times, “Turquoise plays down the need for speed.” Excerpts:

“The marginal benefits have reached diminishing returns,” [Turquoise CEO Eli] Lederman yesterday told a European exchanges conference…”Speed absolutely does matter, it’s just that it’s beocoming commoditised. In itself it is no longer a differentiator.” …

Simon Brickles, chief executive of Plus Markets, a mainly small and mid-cap UK stocks exchange, said: “People are now looking at other issues, like what are the total costs of trading on a platform.”

What do you think? I’d love to hear from folks in technology, trading, operations: are we approaching the point of diminishing returns on investing in reducing latency? And if so, what impact will that have on the business?


Three items that might merit your attention:

ARCA Targets ‘Erroneous’ Trades Problem (TradersMagazine.com) Excerpt:

NYSE Arca, in the wake of trading mishaps that caused the cancellations of thousands of trades on Sept. 19, is introducing a new service that could slow down trading and avoid a repeat of that disastrous day.
The unit of NYSE Euronext has started to incorporate its competitors’ depth-of-book data into its own depth-of-book feed. That will allow it to route orders to more price levels than is required by Regulation NMS. …
That Securities and Exchange Commission rule requires market centers to route unfilled orders to their competitors. But they only need to route to the markets’ best prices.
Under the Arca initiative, the exchange will also route to the second-best, third-best, etc., prices. That will give the competing markets a chance to refresh their top-of-book prices, thereby preventing customers from executing at wildly different top-of-book prices.

So a fast market can be smart, or at least smarter? Sounds like a good idea.

Amex Begins Transformation (TradersMagazine.com) — With the acquisiton by NYSE Euronext, the Amex is being rebranded and more importantly for traders, it’s getting better trading technology and data transparency.

THE CRASH: Risk and Regulation: What Went Wrong (WashingtonPost.com) — Nowhere else have I read such an account of how Washington years ago had (and missed) the chance to regulate the over-the-counter derivatives market.

Have a good weekend, friends. And the rest of you, too! :>)


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